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Abstract 
The Adaptive Architectures for 
Command and Control (A2C2) project 
will include a number of experiments 
over its lifetime. The initial experiment, 
described in this paper, was designed as 
an integration vehicle for the project's 
effort and as a baseline for future 
experiments. 
Motivated by issues that arose during 
initial field research, the first experiment 
addresses the question, "can tasks differ 
in coordination requirements in such a 
way that an organization structure with 
more layers is better for some tasks, while 
a structure with fewer layers is better for 
others?" The experiment was a 2x2 
design, with two levels of organization 
structure (2-tier and 3-tier) and two levels 
of task structure (involving competition 
over internal and external assets, 
respectively). 
The experiment was conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in March 
1996 using the DDD-III, our tier-I 
simulation environment, with military 
officers as subjects. The scenario was 
abstracted from that used in A2C2 field 
research, and was modified to embed 
• This research is funded by a granHrom the Office of 
Naval Research, Cognitive and Neural Sciences Division 
competitive task events that 
operationalized the two levels of task 
structure described above. Dependent 
variables collected included various 
outcome measures, process measures, 
and self-report measures. 
1 Introduction 
The A2C2 project is an ambitious ONR-
sponsored research initiative to: extend 12 years 
of naval composite warfare decisionmaking 
research into the joint C2 arena; focus on adaptive 
architectures within these decisionmaking 
organizations; and produce results ranging from 
purely theoretical to those that can be used by the 
operational forces in the near term. This 
"industry-university-government" initiative 
involves researchers from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), the University of Connecticut, 
Alphatech, Inc., George Mason University, and 
the MITRE Corp. The research program is a 
three-pronged, coordinated effort that involves 
field, experimental, and theoretical components. 
Included are: interviews with experienced joint 
officers; participation in exercises and 
demonstrations; pooling of theoretical and 
analytical techniques to provide models of 
decisionmaking and adaptation; and a three-tiered 
series of experiments with officers in joint settings 
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for measurement of individual and team 
performance in dynamically evolving missions 
and scenarios. 
1.1 Initial Experiment 
The empirical approach to be taken in the A2C2 
project will use a series of increasingly realistic 
experiments. Tier I involves experiments in a 
controlled laboratory environment, tier II 
encompasses experiments in a military wargaming 
environment, and tier III includes experiments in a 
command post exercise or field environment. The 
initial tier I experiment described in this paper 
was designed as an integration vehicle, 
synthesizing or harmonizing the many aspects of 
the project's three-pronged effort, and as a 
baseline for future tier I, II, and III experiments. 
Objectives included: adapting an existing research 
simulator (the DDD) [Song and Kleinman, 1990] 
to a broader operational domain; examining C2 
structure as an independent variable; identifying 
from the literature, field research, and interviews, 
salient research issue(s) that are common to the 
operational and theoretical domains; developing 
joint scenario(s) and task structures down to a 
level amenable to analytic modeling and 
simulation; providing insight into 
wargame/simulator requirements for future 
experiments; and examining measures that may be 
useful for research into adaptive C2 architectures. 
The first experiment was constrained and 
guided by a number of issues: The available 
subjec~ pool at NPS; the requirement that any 
scenano developed be joint in its nature; the 
hardware available to conduct a distributed 
decision-making experiment at NPS; the factors of 
interest to the A2C2 project; 'the requirement that 
the experiment be conducive to modeling and 
simulation; and the limitations and capabilities of 
the newly enhanced DDD-III simulator. Our 
intent was to motivate the experiment based on 
issues that arose from a set of structured 
interviews of joint officers and field visits to 
exercises and warfighting commands. 
1.2 Research Issue and Hypothesis 
The issue chosen for our empirical research is the 
"flattening" of an organization. As a current topic 
in the literature, "flattening" is being examined 
and implemented today, in both military and 
industrial settings. The C4/ for the Warrior and 
Copernicus initiatives call for flattened command 
structures in order to exploit sensor-to-shooter 
communications capabilities and dominant 
battlespace knowledge. 
The issue of flattening also arose during the 
field visits to warfighting commands and in the 
joint officer interviews. The organizational 
structure postulated in the interviews was 
relatively "flat," and several of the officers saw 
reasons to add a layer, typically when one unit 
might need assets . that belonged to a unit in 
another command. (The extra layer would 
presumably facilitate coordination.) But, there is 
a paucity of empirical findings showing whether 
flattening is better for military organizations, and 
if so, when. The specific research issue, then, is: 
"can tasks differ in coordination requirements in 
such a way that an organization structure with 
more layers is better for some tasks, while a 
structure with fewer layers is better for others?" 
Our general hypothesis is that there is an 
interaction between task structure and 
organization structure, and, more specifically, that 
when two units in the same functional area must 
coordinate the use of assets in order to process 
their individual tasks: 
1. An organization with a common functional 
commander is better when the assets are 
owned by one of the two units, whereas, 
2. An organization without a common . 
functional commander is better when the 
assets are owned outside of the functional 
area. 
Tue reasoning behind the first assertion is that 
placing an experienced component commander 
over all forces in a functional area will focus those 
forces on a common mission or goal. The 
subordinate commanders will be more likely to 
make decisions that are optimal for the component 
as a whole, and if they do not, the common 
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commander, with his component-centric focus, 
will be able to mitigate conflicts within the 
component in a timely manner. The overall 
commander, on the other hand, is poorly 
positioned to act as the common commander. He 
focuses at a higher level, considering the air, 
ground, and naval context as.a whole, and is not in 
a position to mitigate · conflicts within a 
component in a timely manner. 
On the other hand, when a lower level 
commander in one functional area needs an asset 
that belongs to the overall commander ( or his 
superiors), and that asset might also be needed by 
a unit in another functional area, the overall 
commander must become cognizant of the 
specific needs within the functional area before he 
allocates the asset. If the overall commander and 
the lower level units all share a common 
operational picture (as in this experiment), the 
overall commander will not, in theory, need 
component commanders to apprise him of the 
seriousness of their respective units' needs before 
he makes his decision. If lower level commanders 
have the common operational picture, they, also in 
theory, should be able to act in a more 
autonomous manner to achieve the commander's 
intent and allocate resources· among themselves. 
As a result, the overall cv,nmander should be able 
to increase his span of control and the 
organization can become "flatter." 
1.3 General a Priori Assumptions 
One assumption was that the subjects' previous 
operational experience would be sufficient to 
enable them to play their roles in the experiment. 
This was done by abstracting decisions to a level 
comensurate with the operational knowledge of 
the subject pool, by abstracting the scenario, and 
by utilizing a "cookbook" approach to weapon 
engagement requirements. Second, we assumed 
that a single officer representing defacto a 
commander and his staff would produce a 
reasonable approximation to the decisionmaking 
results of that unit. Since we do not have the 
ability to conduct laboratory: (tier I) experiments 
with "real" organizations, we have no choice but 
to assume that our team of individuals represents 
the key decisionmakers of an organization. In this 
vein, we provide to the subjects any results and 
assessments that normally would have been 
supplied by "staff," so that focus is on the 
cognitive aspects of commanders' roles. 
2 Scenario 
The scenario for the first experiment was adapted 
from that used for the joint officer interviews, and 
was suitably modified to test our hypothesis. Our 
goal was to design two variants of the same 
scenario, one that involved competition between 
two units over assets that belonged to one of 
them, and the other involving competition 
between these units over assets that belonged to a 
higher-level commander. A brief description of 
the general scenario, and the variations by which 
the two versions were differentiated, follows. For 
a more detailed treatment, see Berigan [1996]. 
2.1 General Background 
Orange, a North African nation friendly to the 
United States, has been attacked by Green, whose 
forces have taken control of Orange's port of 
Eastport. A Joint Task Force (JTF) has been 
organized by a notional theater commander in 
chief, the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean 
Command (CINCMED), in order to capture the 
port and a nearby airfield to allow for the 
introduction of follow-on forces. The 
Commander, JTF (CJTF) has at his disposal an 
aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) and an 
amphibious ready group (ARG) that transports 
two Marine Expeditionary Units (Special 
Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s). 
2.2 Enemy Situation 
Green forces are located at the port, the airfield, 
and at other locations in the amphibious objective 
area. About 5 miles south of the port, there are 
two suitable landing beaches with a road leading 
from the northernmost beach ( designated "Red 
Beach") to the port, and another leading from the 
southernmost beach ( designated "Blue Beach") to 
the airfield. Green threats to the landing force are 
as follows: 
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• Mine fields offshore of one or both 
beaches 
• One or more company-sized armored units 
• Mine fields on roads (swamps restrict off-
road travel) 
• A number of artillery strongpoints 
• Possible hidden FROG surface-to-surface 
missile launchers 
• Heavy mortar platoon in range of Red 
Beach and port 
• Infantry units defending the port and 
airfield 
Green threats to the maritime forces are as 
follows: 
• One or more Alfa-class submarines 
• MI-24 Hind and fixed wing aircraft, 
capable of anti-shp actions _ 
• Fast patrol boats 
• One or more hidden Silkworm anti-ship 
missile launchers 
2.3 Friendly Forces and Asset Ownership 
Assets owned by the five organizational entities 
and available for use in this scenario are initially 
as follows: 
MEU (SOC) 1: 
• One AAA V-mounted infantry company 
• One V-22 Osprey-mounted heliborne 
infantry company 
• One division ( 4) AH-1 W Cobra attack 
helicopters (indivisible) 
• One V-22 mounted combat engineer 
platoon 
• Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) from 
one destroyer 
MEU (SOC)2: 
• One AAA V-mounted infantry company 
• One V-22 Osprey-mounted heliborne 
infantry company 
• One section (2) MEDEV AC helicopters 
(indivisible) 
• NSFS from a second destroyer 
CVBG: 
• Aircraft Carrier 
• AEGIS cruiser 
• Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)-capable 
frigate 
• Combat Air Patrol (CAP) section 
ARG: 
• Two destroyers providing NSFS for 
MEU's 
• Amphibious ships 
• One V-22 mounted Stinger platoon 
(indivisible) 
• One section of CAP 
CJTF: 
• Two sections of close air support (CAS) 
aircraft 
• One mine . countermeasures (MCM) 
helicopter 
• One section of SH-60 helicopters capable 
of performing anti-surface warfare 
(ASUW) 
• One V-22 mounted heliborne infantry 
company (JTF reserve) 
• SR-71 photoreconnaissance mission 
• One section of JFACC F-15's for air 
defense 
2.4 Mission and Execution 
The forces from MEUl and MEU2 will land at 
Red and Blue Beaches, and proceed along the 
roads to capture and secure the port and airfield, 
respectively. They will use their own assets and 
request the CJTF's assets as necessary to clear 
mines at the beaches, conduct MEDEV ACs, 
defeat counterattacking armored units, clear mines 
along the roads, suppress Green artillery, destroy 
Green FROG launchers, and capture the port and 
airfield. 
The maritime units (CVBG and ARG) support 
the amphibious operation with CAS, NSFS, mine 
countermeasures, and air defense assets, while 
defending themselves against air, surface, and 
subsurface threats. They will use their own assets 
and request the CJTF's assets to destroy Green 
submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, 
patrol boats, and Silkworm launchers, as 
necessary. 
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Asset Task(s) Asset Can Accomplish 
AH- I W Cobra Helicopters Enemy Tanks 
Helibome Infantry Company Attack Enemy Positions & Ground Forces 
AAAV-Mounted Infantry Company Attack Enemy Positions & Ground Forces 
Engineer Platoon Clear Mines on Land 
MEDEV AC Helicopters Perform Medical Evacuation 
CAS Aircraft Destroy FROG & Silkworm Launchers 
Frigate PerformASW 
Destroyer Provide NSFS Against Artillery 
AEGIS Cruiser PerformAAW 
SH-60 Helicopters Perform ASUW 
CAP Aircraft PerformAAW 
Stinger Platoon Perform AA W Against Helicopters 
SR-71 Identify Silkworm Launchers 
MCM Helicopters Clear Mines from Beach 
Table 1. Assets and Their Capabilities 
The scenario was designed so that each 
threat ( or "task" to be accomplished) can be 
defeated (or accomplished)'by only one asset in 
that given situation. This "matching" of assets to 
tasks was done in order· to induce the proper 
competition among the subjects, who played the 
roles of unit commanders, for limited JTF assets. 
A breakdown of the assets that must be used to 
accomplish each task is included in Table 1. This 
information was part of the experiment 
instructions and subject training. 
The DDD-III implemented the asset-to-task 
matchings via specification of task resource 
requirements and asset resource capability. To 
each task (and asset) there was associated a 7-
dimension resource vector R = [ r 1, r2, ... , r7] with 
components that correspond to combat 
capability/potential, or task requirements in 
various categories. For example, r 1 = air combat, 
r2 = sea combat, ... , r5 = mines, r6 = 
holding/occupying, r7 = MEDEVAC. By giving a 
specific task a set of values for R the DDD-III 
establishes what (mix of) assets with their 
corresponding Rs suffice to correctly process that 
task. Thus, MCM helicopters would have values 
for r5 corresponding to those required for mine 
clearing tasks, but other assets would have lower 
values for r5, or zero. 
3 Experimental Design 
The experiment was a 2x2 design. The factors 
were task structure at two levels . and 
organizational structure at two levels. 
3.1 Levels of Task Structure 
Task structure can be described and differentiated 
across a number of dimensions that include 
uncertainty, time pressure, complexity, 
coordination requirements, magnitude, resources 
required, information required, formalization, and 
dynamicity [Berigan, 1996]. The dimension that 
was varied in this experiment was coordination 
requirements. We constructed two variations to 
the scenario outlined above, corresponding to two 
levels of task coordination requirements: Scenario 
A required the two components of the JTF 
(ground and maritime) to coordinate use of 
organic assets ( assets that are owned by one of the 
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units within that component); Scenario B required 
the same two components of the JTF to coordinate 
non-organic assets ( assets owned outside the 
component, e.g., by the CJTF or theater CINC). 
Thus, one task structure required coordination of 
organic assets, while the · other required 
coordination of non-organic assets. 
Competition events were inserted into each 
scenario in order to stress the organization's 
ability to coordinate assets. One unit within each 
component (e.g., MEUl in the ground 
component) competed with the other unit of the 
same component ( e.g., MEU2) for a one-of-a-kind 
asset. The scenarios were designed so that the 
ground components and maritime components did 
not compete cross-comi:;onent-wise over assets 
(thus potentially confounding our results). The 
"correct" response in all cases required an asset 
transfer from one unit to another - in no 
competition event could following the path of 
least resistance, i.e., keeping the asset with its 
original owner, result in the proper solution to the 
dilemma. A description of the operationalization 
of the competition events follows. 
3.1.1 Competition over Organic Assets: Scenario A 
The ground component units (MEU 1 and 
MEU2) competed for MEUl 's engineer platoon 
and Cobras and MEU2's MEDEV AC helicopters. 
The maritime component (ARG and CVBG) 
competed over the ARG's Stinger platoon and the 
CVBG's Aegis cruiser, frigate, and section of 
CAP aircraft. Non-organic ··assets that were not · 
competed over, but were used, were the reserve 
helibome company, MCM helicopter, JF ACC 
CAP aircraft, the SH-60s, the SR-71 mission, and 
the CAS aircraft to be used against Silkworms and 
FROGs. These non-organic assets were competed 
for in Scenario B. 
On the ground side, the MEDEVAC 
helicopters were competed for first, by having the 
DDD-III generate two MEDEV AC "tasks" 
simultaneously. This required the subjects to 
determine which MED EV AC had higher priority 
by checking the tasks' attributes, and allocating 
the MEDEVAC helicopters accordingly. Next, 
armored columns appeared on both roads at the 
same time, requiring the subjects to determine 
which unit had priority for use of the Cobra 
helicopters. Finally, minefields were detected on 
both roads at the same time, again requiring a 
determination of priority, this time with regard to 
the engineer platoon. 
On the maritime side, two enemy submarines 
appeared, one headed for the ARG and the other 
toward the CVBG, and the subjects had to 
determine whether the ARG or CVBG had 
priority for use of the frigate. Next, Green Hind 
helicopters with antiship missiles were detected 
preparing to take off from two airfields, one 
within range of the CVBG and the other within 
range of the ARG, causing competition over the 
Stinger platoon. Finally, one CAP section was 
forced to return with mechanical problems as air 
threats were detected taking off against both the 
ARG and the CVBG. This caused competition 
over the remaining section of CAP and the AEGIS 
cnnser. 
3.1.2 Competition over Non-Organic Assets: Scenario B 
In this scenario, the organic and non-organic 
assets were the same as in Scenario A; however, 
the scenario was crafted such that organic assets 
were not competed over, while the non-organic 
assets were. Scenario B unfolded as did Scenario 
A, except that competition occurred in different 
events (i.e., "tasks").·. 
On the ground side, the lead elements of both 
MEUs simultaneously detected mines as they 
approached the beaches, and the subjects had to 
determine which MEU had priority for the MCM 
helicopters. Next, FROG launchers were detected 
simultaneously by both MEUs, and the subjects 
had to determine which MEU had priority for the 
CAS aircraft. Finally, as MEUI and MEU2 
approached their objectives, they learned that 
neither would be able to achieve it (seize port and 
airfield) without reinforcements, and once again 
the subjects had to determine who should have 
priority for the non-organic reinforcements. 
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On the mant1me side, two Silkworm sites 
were reported preparing to fire missiles, each 
requiring SR-71 overflight-to precisely pinpoint 
its location for destruction wtth CAS aircraft. The 
subjects had to determine whether the ARG or the 
CVBG had priority in defending against those 
threats. Next, both sections of CAP aircraft from 
the aircraft carrier returned to base because of 
mechanical problems, and the only CAP aircraft 
available was a section of F-15s from the JFACC, 
over which the ARG and CVBG competed. 
Finally, fast patrol boats were detected heading 
toward both the ARG and CVBG, and the subjects 
had to determine whether the ARG or CVBG had 
priority for the SH-60 asset. 
3.2 Organizational Structures 
The two levels of organizational structure used for 
this experiment were: 
• Three-Tiered, with a common functional 
commander, either a ground component 
commander (GCC): or a maritime 
component commander (MCC), 
supervising the mo lowest-level units. 
• Two-Tiered, with the lowest-level units 
reporting directly to the CJTF 
Although the two-tiered and three-tiered 
structures were separated for analysis, the two JTF 
organizations that were used for the experiment 
each had an intermediate commander supervising 
one component and none supervising the other. 
Thus, in half of the runs there was a GCC, while 
in the other half there was an MCC. This was 
done in order to keep the number of subjects 
constant across all trials, and avoid task-load-per-
individual problems that would have arisen had 
the two structures been composed of different 
numbers of subjects. The two organizational 
structures are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
3.3 Operationalization of Organization Structure 
The organization structures shown in Figures 1 
and 2 above were operationalized in three 
significant ways: asset structure, communications 
structure, and information structure. 
GCC CVBG 
MEU 1 MEU2 
Figure I. 3-Tier Ground Hierarchy 




Figure 2. 2-Tier Ground Hierarchy 
3-Tier 1';4aritime Hierarchy 
3.3.1 Asset Structure 
The scenarios were designed so that if a unit 
must peform a specific task, then the assets 
required should be transferred to that unit, rather 
than the original owner attempting to perform the 
task for the unit that required the asset. For 
example, if MEU2 was under attack by a tank 
column, we wanted MEUl to transfer the 
necessary asset (the Cobra helicopters) to MEU2 
to destroy the tanks, rather than MEUI destroy the 
tanks itself. This led to the issue of 
transferrability. 
All assets in the scenario were transferrable, 
with few exceptions. The non-transferrable assets 
included such assets as the amphibious shipping 
and the aircraft carrier, which were not directly 
needed to accomplish competitive tasks. All 
assets shown on Table 1 were transferrable by 
their owners. 
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If the asset owner chose not to transfer an 
asset as requested by a unit needing it, a higher-
level decisionmaker could force transfer of the 
asset(s). For example, if the ARG requested an 
asset from the CVBG, and the CVBG ignored the 
request, the MCC (if present) or CJTF could 
forcibly transfer the asset from the CVBG to the 
ARG, if he determined that the ARG's need for 
the asset outweighed that of the CVBG. 
3.3.2 Communications Structure 
Communications in this experiment were 
limited to preformatted messages using the DDD-
III simulator. No verbal communications were 
allowed. 
Copies of all messages sent by a 
decisionmaker were automatically forwarded to 
the next higher level in the hierarchy. If a lower-
level unit, such as MEU 1, communicated with 
another low-level unit, such as MEU 2, a copy of 
the message was sent to the intermediate 
commander. In this case, that is the GCC (if 
present) or the CJTF. And, if the intermediate 
level commander communicated with a lower 
level unit, a copy of his message was forwarded to 
the CJTF. 
When an intermediate level commander was 
present, the low-level units could not 
communicate directly with the CJTF. In such 
cases communications followed the chain of 
command via the MCC or GCC, as the case may 
be. ' 
3.3.3 Information Structure 
One of the major assumptions behind the 
"flattening" concept discussed earlier is the 
existence of a common operational picture (COP). 
All commanders at all levels must have a common 
view of the battlespace - they must see the same 
threats, at the same time. Since our purpose was 
to test organizational structures in a future 
environment of shared, global information, the 
COP was one of the givens of our experiment. 
When one decisionmaker in the organization saw 
a threat or task, it was seen by all others at the 
same time. It was felt that this common view 
might reduce parochialism in certain 
circumstances, through fostering of shared mental 
models among team members. 
4 Experiment Setup and Execution 
4.1 Test Subjects 
The test subjects were 24 military officer students 
from the Joint C4I Systems curriculum at NPS. 
The subjects were organized into four six-person 
teams. The te~s were formed by the 
experimenters with participants distributed 
according to military occupational/warfighting 
specialty and branch of service, to the extent that 
that was possible given the demographics of the 
sample. 
There was concern that some subjects would 
be more familiar than others with the appropriate 
tactics to employ in a given scenario, and that this 
might affect the data. In order to counter such an 
impact, the scenarios and the operations order 
were tailored to facilitate a "cookbook" approach 
to each situation. In this way, the experimenters 
attempted to steer the subjects toward the 
competition events that we wanted to study. 
4.2 Physical Facilities 
The six test subjects for each team were presented 
the scenario on a distp.buted, interactive, computer 
simulation running 0n seven SUN SPARC™ 
workstations. (The seventh station was the 
experimentor's station.) The facility used was the 
Systems Technology Laboratory at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Although 
the subjects were in the same room, dividers were 
placed between them, and (to facilitate subsequent 
data analysis) communications among subjects 
was restricted to preformatted computer messages 
built into the simulator. 
4.3 Special Equipment 
The experiment was conducted using the 
Distributed Dynamic Decisionmaking-lII (DDD-
III) simulator. Earlier variants of the DDD had 
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been used extensively in . the past to study 
decisionrnaking in the Navy':s Composite Warfare 
Commander (CWC) organizational structure. In a 
concommitant effort, the DDD was extended to fit 
the general requirements of tier-I experimentation 
for the A2C2 project, and was adapted to meet the 
specific requirements of the current experiment. 
The NPS students assisting with conduct of the 
experiment, referred to as the "lead team," 
developed a tutorial designed to aid the subjects in 
using the DDD-111 to play the scenarios. 
4.4 Schedule of Trials 
The experiment took place during the weeks of 4-
8 March and 11-15 March 1996. Two of the four 
teams were run through the experiment each 
week. Each team completed four training runs 
( one for each condition), followed by four trials 
during which data was collected. The training 
runs and the data collection runs were each 40 
minutes long, interrupted twice for situational 
awareness probes. In order to compensate for any 
learning effects, the d~ita-collection trials were 
counterbalanced so that each team encountered 
the four conditions in a different order. 
5 Dependent Variables 
Outcome measures ( e.g., number and correctness 
of mission tasks), decisionmaking and 
coordination process measures ( e.g., 
communication patterns, information flow, 
resource transfers), and self-report measures ( e.g., 
workload, situation assessment) were collected 
and are only now being analyzed. Thus, the 
measures described below are tentative. It is 
probable that some of these will not play 
significantly in the analysis, while other, new, 
measures may prove more useful. 
5.1 Outcome Measures 
Initially, seven outcome measures were chosen as 
indicative of a team's effectiveness in 
accomplishing the desired tasks. The first six of 
these are recorded/aggregated automatically by 
the DDD-111 software. 
• Average latency time to complete a ( class 
of) tasks once they appear ( e.g., suppress 
artillery). 
• Mission Score: The accuracy with which 
m1ss10n tasks (weighted by their 
importance) were completed. 
• Strength Score: The summation of all 
friendly force losses arising from attacking 
a neutral, enemy penetration of a defense 
zone, or improper resource alloaction to an 
attack. 
• Time the Airfield was captured. 
• Time the Port was captured. 
• Number of enemy penetrations to ground 
and maritime defense zones. 
• Competition score from observer rating 
forms. 
The first six are aggregate scores for the 
team's overall effectiveness. The competition 
score focused on just the competitive situations 
faced by the team. It was expected that this 
measure would be a good indicator of the degree 
to which the intermediate level of hierarchy 
contributed to resolving, or reducing competition. 
The average latency was an indicator of how 
well the team was working together, anticipating 
requirements, and resolving conflicts. The 
mission score was a measure of whether the team 
accomplished all of its objectives, and, if not, it 
gave some indication of how well the subjects 
prioritized tasks. The strength score reflected how 
well the team did in recognizing the high priority 
threats and resolving competition for scarce assets 
correctly. The time of capture for the port and 
airfield also indicated whether competitions were 
dealt with correctly, as dictated by the operations 
order (OPORDER). For example, the OPORDER 
specifically stated th~t the attack on the airfield 
had priority, and should not be held up by the 
attack on the port. If the competition between the 
MEU(SOC)s was not resolved quickly and 
correctly, the airfield attack would probably be 
delayed. 
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The competition score measure aimed at the 
crux of the experiment. It provided a means to 
directly assess how well a competition event was 
resolved in each scenario. The possible courses of 
action were decided upon in advance by the lead 
team on the basis of their military experience and 
knowledge of the scenarios and operations order. 
Six possible courses of action for each 
competition event were defined. Then, the 
observed course(s) of action were ranked by the 
lead team on the basis ; of their perceived 
correctness to the competition event(s). The 
courses of action that each team took in each 
scenario were recorded. 
5.2 Process Measures 
Process measures attempt to capture the 
mechanics of how the team "went about its 
business." The primary vehicle for collecting this 
data is a time-tagged logfile produced by the 
DDD-III that records every action (and 
communication) taken by each subject. Analysis 
of this data yields the raw communications flow 
(who sent what message to whom and when), as 
well as aggregated measures such as ratio of 
resource requests to resource transfers by the team 
as a whole or by individuals. This data also 
provides time threading of (team) responses to 
individual tasks from their time of appearance to 
the time that assets are used to prosecute them. 
As this experiment focussed largely on the 
ability of a team to cc,o.rdinate/share its assets 
through resource transfer, key process measures 
include who effected the transfer (asset owner or a 
higher-level authority), response delay to a 
request for assets, etc. Other process measures 
include who did which task in those cases when 
one or more decisionmakers could (subject to any 
task-organization mapping constraints) - and 
how these actions were coordinated, who sent 
information and task identification assessments to 
whom, etc. 
5.3 Self-Report Measures 
The experiment was interrupted/frozen by the 
experimenter twice in the course of each scenario 
in order to collect situation assessment data from 
the team. These and other self-report measures 
are described in a companion paper. 
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